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• During the 1990s, liquidity in the market for
Government of Canada securities has been
supported by changes in market structure.
These include the introduction of benchmark
bond issues, the increasing use of inter-dealer
brokers, and a slight rise in the level of dealer
competition.
• Liquidity in the bond market has generally
beneﬁted from a shift in the Canadian
government’s debt-management strategy, but
liquidity in the treasury bill market has
decreased since 1995, largely because of the
declining supply of these securities.
• While below that of the large U.S. Treasury
market, liquidity in the market for Canadian
government securities appears to compare
favourably with that in the government
securities markets of other industrialized
countries.
n most industrialized countries, the market for
government securities is viewed as a key
ﬁnancial market that performs several impor-
tant functions. This market is of particular
interest to central banks. It is here that they usually
perform their domestic monetary operations and from
here that they extract information on expectations of
future movements in interest rates. It is also the mar-
ket in which governments raise funds and is thus of
particular interest to central banks with ﬁscal agency
responsibilities, such as the Bank of Canada. Further-
more, because of their virtually riskless nature, gov-
ernment securities function as the pricing benchmark
and hedging vehicle for other ﬁxed-income securities.
They also serve as collateral (or as part of regulatory
liquidity requirements) for various ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries, enabling them to ﬁnance their operations.
Finally, since other ﬁxed-income markets possess
many of the structural and institutional characteristics
of government securities markets, a greater under-
standing of how the government securities market
functions provides central banks with a better under-
standing of broader ﬁxed-income markets.
Liquidity is an important dimension of all ﬁnancial
markets, and the liquidity of government securities
markets is important to central banks interested in
maintaining or enhancing the functioning of these
markets.
This article reviews some of the factors that underlie
liquidity in the market for Government of Canada
(GOC) securities. It also compares the degree of liquid-
ity with that of government debt markets in other
industrialized countries.
I
This article is an abbreviated version of Gravelle (1999a). The data used for the international comparisons are taken from a recent study by the Bank
for International Settlements (1999). A more thorough cross-country examination of government securities market liquidity issues is presented in
that study.10 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 1999
Deﬁning Market Liquidity
Because of its multi-dimensional nature, market
liquidity is a concept that eludes simple deﬁnition or
easy measurement. While most market participants
would agree whether or not a speciﬁc market is liquid,
few would be able to precisely identify all the factors
contributing to that market’s liquidity. Nevertheless,
there is a fairly wide consensus that a liquid market is
one where large transactions can be completed quickly with
little impact on prices.
In the academic literature, market liquidity is typically
deﬁned over four dimensions: immediacy, depth, width
(bid-ask spread), and resiliency. Immediacy refers to the
speed with which a trade of a given size at a given
width is completed. Depth refers to the maximum size
of a trade for any given bid-ask spread. Width refers to
the costs of providing liquidity (with narrower
spreads implying greater liquidity). Resiliency refers to
how quickly prices and price movements revert to
“normal” levels after a large transaction or how
quickly imbalances in transaction ﬂows dissipate. The
various dimensions of liquidity tend to interact. For
example, for a given (immediate) trade, width will
generally increase with size or, for a given bid-ask
spread, all transactions under a given size can be exe-
cuted (immediately) with no movement in the price or
the spread.
In the context of government
securities markets, liquidity may best
be thought of in terms of the cost of
supplying immediacy.
In the context of government securities markets,
liquidity may best be thought of in terms of the cost of
supplying immediacy. In these markets, the cost of an
immediate trade will vary depending on the size and
direction of the trade and on variations in the market-
makers’ costs of providing this immediacy.
Market liquidity is inﬂuenced by the way the market
is structured.1 Most government securities markets
1.  See O’Hara (1995) for a useful introduction to the academic literature deal-
ing with market microstructure issues.
are quote-driven, multi-dealer markets rather than
order-driven, auction-agency markets, and the actions
of the dealers provide much of the market liquidity.2
Therefore, one means of assessing the level of liquid-
ity in a government securities market involves study-
ing the factors that inﬂuence dealer incentives and
costs when making markets and supplying liquidity.3
Also contributing to a market’s liquidity is the secu-
rity’s inherent liquidity. The security’s inherent liquid-
ity is, in turn, related to several factors including the
amount of the security outstanding and its effective
supply.4 Other structural factors that inﬂuence the
level of liquidity in the government securities market
include transparency, transaction taxes, interest rate
volatility, and derivatives market activity.
Readily available data on all four dimensions of
liquidity are not easy to come by. Thus, other meas-
ures are often used as proxies for market liquidity.
These include trading volume, turnover ratios, and
quoted bid-ask spreads.
Readily available data on . . . liquidity
are not easy to come by.
Trading volume is the most commonly used measure
of liquidity in government securities markets. How-
ever, trading intensity and, in turn, liquidity is more
speciﬁcally measured by the turnover ratio, deﬁned as
total trading volume divided by the stock of securities
outstanding.5 The level of trading intensity is also
2.  Markets with auction-agency structures (often called order-driven mar-
kets) are characterized by the existence of limit-order books and/or non-dis-
cretionary matching systems. Speciﬁcally, standing (limit) orders to buy or
sell some quantity of an asset at some pre-speciﬁed price are arranged in an
order book. As new limit orders or market orders (deﬁned as orders to buy or
sell at the best price in the book) come into the auction agency, they are
matched up (using standard rules) with the existing orders in the book. The
“books” in nearly all auction-agency markets, like the “downstairs market” at
the Toronto Stock Exchange, are now electronic as are most of the matching
systems.
3.  In reality, not all government securities dealers can be considered market-
makers. But in this article, the term dealers, unless speciﬁed otherwise, refers
to market-makers.
4.  Effective supply is deﬁned as the outstanding amount of the security less
the portion held by buy-and-hold investors.
5. Trading intensity refers to the number of transactions that take place over a
set period, while trading volume refers to the currency value of trading activ-
ity over a set period.11 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 1999
reﬂected in the bid-ask spreads quoted by dealers. As
trading intensity increases, dealers ﬁnd it easier (less
costly) to rebalance their inventory to their desired
level, and they can quote narrower spreads since their
inventory-control costs decline. In many ways, the
spread is a broader indicator of the level of liquidity
than turnover data, since it also reﬂects many of the
other factors inﬂuencing the dealers’ costs of provid-
ing liquidity.6 These include: adverse selection con-
cerns (a dealer’s concern that the agent with whom
he/she is trading is better informed about an asset’s
value), order-processing costs, dealer competition,
search costs, and the costs of inventory-risk manage-
ment.
Recent Trends
Indicators of liquidity in the GoC securities
market
Charts 1 through 4 present the readily available indi-
cators of liquidity. The top panel of Chart 1 shows that
until 1997, weekly trading volumes in the market for
Government of Canada bonds rose along with the
increase in outstanding stock. The bottom panel indi-
cates that turnover ratios in the bond market
increased steeply from 1990 to the end of 1996, and
then remained relatively ﬂat until the autumn of 1998.
What are the factors behind these trends in trading
activity? As discussed in Gravelle (1999a and b), trad-
ing activity for government securities is positively
related to the effective supply of the traded securities.
This implies that trading volumes tend to increase
(decrease) more quickly than the rise (fall) in their
stock outstanding, which, in turn, leads to a rise (fall)
in the turnover ratio. In the case of GOC bonds, the
introduction of benchmark bond issues in 1992 and
the increase in the target size of these issues since that
time, as well as the government’s strategy of increas-
ing the proportion of domestic marketable debt in the
form of bonds from 56 per cent in March 1995 to
73 per cent in June 1999, have all increased the effec-
tive supply and, in turn, the liquidity of this market.7
Increases in effective supply will also generally be
reﬂected in narrower bid-ask spreads, since a market-
6.  There is no consensus in the academic literature about the superiority of
quoted bid-ask spreads over transaction data. For example, Datar et al. (1998)
suggest that a measure similar to the turnover ratio has several advantages as
a proxy for liquidity over quoted bid-ask spreads.
7. Gravelle (1999a) provides further details on how the government changed
its issuance practices to allow for the buildup of large benchmark bonds.
maker’s cost of providing immediacy is inﬂuenced by
the trading intensity of the security. Thus, outside of
the spikes in late 1994 and in the autumn of 1998, it is
not surprising to ﬁnd that bid-ask spreads for bonds
displayed a slight downward trend until the end of
1996 (Chart 2) as the outstanding stock of bonds was
rising, and, since then, have remained relatively ﬂat as
the stock of bonds plateaued.
Trading activity for government
securities is positively related to the
effective supply of the traded
securities.
In the case of the treasury bill market, the data indi-
cate that after a sharp rise from 1991 to 1995, the turn-
over ratio declined markedly. Here too, the effective
supply of treasury bills played a role in determining
the turnover ratio. The government’s strategy of
increasing the proportion of ﬁxed debt, together with
lower ﬁnancing requirements, led to a signiﬁcant
decline in the stock of treasury bills and, in turn, to a
corresponding decline in trading activity after 1995
(Chart 3).8 Bid-ask spreads in the treasury bill market,
after having trended down slightly in the early 1990s,
when the stock of bills was rising, have trended up
with the decline of their effective supply (Chart 4).
In the case of the treasury bill market,
the data indicate that after a sharp
rise from 1991 to 1995, the turnover
ratio declined markedly.
In summary, the liquidity of the Canadian treasury bill
market has deteriorated since 1996, while the GOC
bond market has generally held on to the gains
8. See Boisvert and Harvey (1998) and Harvey (1999) for more details on how
the declining supply has affected the treasury bill market.12 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 1999
Chart 1
Government of Canada Bonds: Trading Activity
Chart 2
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achieved over the ﬁrst part of the 1990s. These liquid-
ity indicators show a link between the effective supply
of government securities and the liquidity of the mar-
ket. 9
Because market-makers will widen their quoted
spreads with an increase in interest rate volatility (or
risk), which increases their inventory-risk-manage-
ment costs, it is not surprising to see that the large
transitory spikes in the spreads for treasury bills and
bonds in Charts 2 and 4 coincide with sudden
increases in short- and long-term interest rates, respec-
tively (Chart 5).10 Thus, the jumps in treasury bill
spreads that occurred in late 1992, early 1995, and in
the autumn of 1998, correspond to sudden increases in
3-month interest rates during those periods, while the
increase in bond spreads that occurred in late 1994
and in the autumn of 1998 coincide with sudden
increases in long-term rates. Although the largest
jump (autumn 1998) coincided with the smallest rise
in interest rates, it also occurred at the height of the
ﬁnancial market turbulence that followed the Asian
crisis.
9.  Gravelle (1999a) presents statistical evidence of the link between effective
supply and liquidity in the GoC securities market.
10.  Fleming and Remolona (1999) ﬁnd empirical evidence that bid-ask
spreads for U.S. Treasury securities increase during periods of (intra-day)
interest rate volatility. This supports the hypothesis that the bid-ask spreads
of risk-averse dealers reﬂect their inventory-control costs. Statistical evidence
showing the positive correlation of bid-ask spreads for GoC securities with
interest rate volatility is presented in Gravelle (1999a).
Chart 5
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Broad factors affecting the evolution of
liquidity in the GoC securities market
As mentioned, bid-ask spreads and liquidity more
generally are also inﬂuenced by factors related to the
structure of the market which, in turn, tend to be the
factorsthatinﬂuencethedealers’costsassociatedwith
providing liquidity to the market. It is important to
emphasize, however, that these structural factors
work by shaping the environment, making it condu-
cive to greater or lesser levels of liquidity in the securi-
ties market, rather than by directly affecting the state
of market liquidity.
Because of the multiple-dealer structure of the GOC
securities market, it is important to understand how
dealers manage their (security) inventory risks, since
this affects their ability or capacity to supply liquidity
to the market. Dealers prefer to manage these risks by
rebalancing their inventory levels with offsetting cus-
tomer orders. Since the timing of offsetting customer
orders rarely coincides with a dealer’s rebalancing
needs, dealers will often go to the inter-dealer market
for such rebalancing. They can also hedge their expo-
sure with an offsetting position in the futures or repo
markets.11
When rebalancing their inventory positions, dealers
often ﬁnd it quicker to sell off (acquire) their
unwanted (wanted) inventory positions via inter-
dealer brokers (IDBS).12 The use of IDBS lowers the
search cost associated with ﬁnding the best available
price in the inter-dealer market and, at the same time,
allows dealers to trade anonymously with each other.
These factors, theoretically, reduce the costs associated
with providing liquidity.13 Table 1 presents data
11.   For example, dealers’ inventory positions can be hedged by taking
offsetting short positions in the futures market or by borrowing the security
they do not hold in inventory and then selling it short. The borrowing of
government securities is carried out in the repo market.
12.  Inter-dealer brokers provide communications networks that link dealers.
The “broker screens” that they provide allow dealers both to post their bid-
ask quotes and volumes at which they are prepared to trade a particular gov-
ernment security and to act on other dealers’ quotations on the same system.
A dealer initiates a trade by contacting the broker, indicating its intention to
trade against a posted offer. The initiator and the dealer who posted the offer
then trade via the broker, rather than bilaterally. Thus, inter-dealer brokers
offer anonymity by placing themselves between the two counterparties and
also reduce search costs because dealers can visually (on the screens) seek out
the best quote available rather than sequentially contacting individual dealers.
13.  There is empirical evidence indicating that an increase in the level of ano-
nymity in the inter-dealer market increases liquidity (Scalia and Vacca 1999).
Support for the hypothesis that an increase in IDB trading narrows bid-ask
spreads and thus improves GoC securities market liquidity can be found in
studies that show that IDBs reduce the amount of searching dealers do (Gar-
bade 1978) and that the search-cost component of the bid-ask spread is eco-
nomically signiﬁcant (Flood et al. 1999).14 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 1999
illustratingtheevolutionofthisinventory-rebalancing
activity in the GOC securities market. It is clear from
the table that government securities dealers are con-
ducting an increasing proportion of their inter-dealer
trading via IDBS (see last column). Although dealers
suggest that this stems from the decline in broker fees
over the years, it nonetheless implies an increasing
level of anonymous inter-dealer trading and lower
search costs, making it easier and/or less costly for
dealers to rebalance their inventories. This makes
them more willing to trade and quote markets to cus-
tomers, thus contributing to enhanced market liquidity.
Government securities dealers are
conducting an increasing proportion
of their inter-dealer trading via IDBs.
Quoted bid-ask spreads and, in turn, the cost of
liquidity that customers (as opposed to dealers) face
are inﬂuenced by the level of competition among deal-
ers. Because dealers compete for market share
through the bid-ask spreads they quote, any increase
in dealer competition puts downward pressure on
bid-ask spreads. Table 2 presents annual statistics on
market concentration for both the bond and treasury
bill markets: the Herﬁndahl index and the 10-ﬁrm
concentration ratio.14 In the bond market, both indica-
14.  The concentration ratio measures the sum of the market share for the top
10 dealers in terms of their secondary market turnover. The Herﬁndahl index
is deﬁned as the sum of the squared individual market shares of all reporting
dealers.
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tors displayed a generally downward trend until 1998,
indicating a decrease in concentration that coincided
broadly with the slight narrowing of bid-ask spreads
observed in the bond market until 1998 (Chart 2). In
the treasury bill market, the concentration statistics
tended to be relatively ﬂat over the sample period.
Quoted bid-ask spreads . . . are
inﬂuenced by the level of competition
among dealers.
Broadly speaking, there is a general consensus among
market participants and academics that the dissemi-
nation of prevailing prices in the market to customers
as well as to dealers enhances market liquidity.15
Thus, the arrival in the spring of 1999 of the CanPX
system (which displays inter-dealer bid-ask quotations
and volumes for a limited number of GOC securities on
one screen via the Internet and through information
vendors such as Reuters) should increase the level of
transparency in the GOC securities market. Judging
from the importance of the GovPX system in the
United States (on which CanPX is modelled) to U.S.
Treasury market participants, this innovation offers
the potential to improve the liquidity of the market.
15.  See Scalia and Vacca (1999) as well as Gravelle (1999b) for a summary of
some of the issues related to market transparency.
Table 2
Measures of Concentration in Secondary
Market Turnover
Bond market Treasury bill market
10-ﬁrm Herﬁndahl 10-ﬁrm Herﬁndahl








0.90 0.091 0.96 0.15
0.89 0.090 0.96 0.14
0.84 0.082 0.96 0.14
0.81 0.082 0.96 0.14
0.84 0.082 0.95 0.13
0.86 0.088 0.95 0.15
* Represents the weighted average of pre- and post-merger concentration statistics. See
Gravelle (1999a) for details concerning the timing of these domestic-dealer mergers.15 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 1999
The arrival in the spring of 1999 of
the CanPX system . . . should
increase the level of transparency in
the GoC securities market.
Some Stylized Cross-Country
Comparisons
Given the importance of liquidity in government secu-
rities markets for the functioning of ﬁnancial markets
generally, it is surprising that the determinants and
mechanics of liquidity in government securities mar-
kets have received scant attention from the academic
community. Most research into the mechanics of mar-
ket liquidity has concentrated on equity markets (and,
more recently, foreign exchange markets), leaving
ﬁxed-income markets as relatively virgin territory.
Recent work at the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) has provided data that allow some international
comparisons of liquidity in government securities
markets. Here, these data are used to make compari-
sons that span both readily available liquidity indica-
tors, such as turnover and bid-ask spreads, and factors
of a more structural nature. It should be emphasized,
however, that the level of detail is insufﬁcient for more
than a stylized analysis.
Most research into the mechanics
of market liquidity has concentrated
on equity markets (and,
more recently, foreign exchange
markets).
Indicators of market liquidity
The BIS data were compiled from 11 industrialized
countries and provide a “snapshot” of overall market
liquidity in each country in 1997. Although the degree
of market liquidity varies across several dimensions,
let alone across individual securities within each
market, it is still useful to examine the existing liquid-
ity conditions in each market by comparing both the
turnover ratios and bid-ask spreads. The turnover
data presented in Table 3 provide a rough overview
of the aggregate liquidity conditions across the mar-
kets.16 This indicates that turnover ratios, deﬁned as
yearly trading volume divided by the outstanding
stock of government securities, were relatively high in
the Canadian, French, Swedish, and U.S. markets.17
The data for quoted bid-ask spread are of special
interest, since the spread reﬂects many of liquidity’s
underlying components and is, therefore, ideal for
comparison across a spectrum of different market
structures. Because actual market data are not availa-
ble in several of the countries, some of the spreads
were estimated by central banks. Also, some of the
spread data represent average levels over an extended
period, which likely include spells of spread widening
due to temporary periods of market turbulence. The
spreads presented in Table 3 indicate that the greatest
amount of liquidity can be found in the U.S. market,
which was also one of the countries with a higher
turnover ratio. Historically, the data have shown that,
over time, countries with higher turnover ratios tend
to be those with lower bid-ask spreads.
Comparison of market structural factors
Before outlining the structural differences that exist
between the various markets, it is useful to outline
their broad common characteristics. Government
securities markets are usually decentralized multiple-
dealer markets. Most of these markets function along-
side afﬁliated markets, such as repo and futures mar-
kets, that use the government security as the
underlying asset or as collateral. Most governments in
the sample (with the exception of the Netherlands)
issue their securities by auction. Most countries have
set up primary dealer systems18 to facilitate the issu-
ance process (Japan, Germany, and Switzerland are
16.  The ﬁgures in Tables 3, 4, and 5 combine data on turnover and stock out-
standing for both ﬁxed-coupon and discount government debt instruments
commonly referred to as bonds and treasury bills.
17.  Turnover ratios are not perfectly comparable across countries since they
ignore the fact that, in certain countries, the governments and central banks
hold, until maturity, sizable portions of the government securities outstand-
ing. For example, in Japan in 1997, 46 per cent of the securities were held by
the government and the central bank, implying, in effect, a higher turnover
ratio than indicated.
18.  This is a group of selected dealers with responsibilities to support the
functioning of the government market.16 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 1999
the exceptions). And the policy of reopening existing
issues to create large liquid benchmark issues is com-
mon to all the countries studied, except Japan.19
As noted above, instead of rebalancing their inventory
positions, dealers can hedge their positions using
interest rate futures. The existence of a market for
interest rate futures, or an increase in the level of that
market’s liquidity, improves the dealer’s ability to
carry out inventory-risk management in the cash mar-
ket, which, in turn, promotes greater liquidity in that
market. Trading activity in the futures market (due to
speculative activity) may also increase activity in the
cash market through arbitrage.20 The futures/cash
ratios shown in Table 4 provide a rough indication of
the relative importance of the futures markets for
government securities relative to the cash markets.
19.   Unlike the United States, which has no explicit policy for reopening cou-
pon securities, other countries do so in order to increase the issue size in light
of the dealers’ limited subscription capacity.
20.  There may instead be an inverse relation between trading activity in the
cash and futures market. Because both instruments reﬂect the same underly-
ing interest rate risks, investors may choose to speculate about these risks in
one instrument rather than in both. In this case, cash issues (particularly
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10 285 6,243 21.9
n.a. 232 947 4.1
24 551 18,6341 33.8
10 563 n.a. n.a.
4 1,100 8,419 7.7
162 1,919 13,282 6.9
n.a. 176 4501 2.6
8 458 3,222 7.0
3.1 3,457 75,901 22.0
273 111 3,626 32.7
25 35 1251 3.6
Note: Trading volumes are for the 1997 calendar year, while the ﬁgures for the stock
of debt outstanding are for the end of 1997. In this and the data that follow, the ﬁgures
were converted to U.S. dollars at the rate prevailing at the end of 1997. (US$1 =
Can$1.43 = ITL1,770 = ¥130 = BEF37.1 = FFr6.02 = DM1.80 = Dﬂ2.03 = SKr7.93 =
SFr1.46, £1 = US$1.65). The bid-ask spreads are given in one-hundredths of a
currency unit for the face amount of 100 currency units. Unless indicated otherwise,
the spreads are for on-the-run or benchmark, 30-year, ﬁxed-coupon issues.
Source: BIS (1999)
1. Figures may include trading other than outright transactions, such as repos or
buy/sell backs.
2. For 20-year bonds
3. For 22-year bonds
Canada and Belgium have the smallest futures mar-
kets both in absolute terms and/or in relation to their
cash markets.21 In principle, countries with a well-
developed and liquid futures market should experi-
ence greater trading activity in the cash market.
Although government securities are relatively fungi-
ble instruments in comparison with other ﬁxed-
income instruments, because there is only one issuer
per country, there is still a high degree of fragmenta-
tion in the existing stock of outstanding debt, since
each issue differs in its coupon rate and maturity.
While dealer markets are better suited than auction-
agency markets to handle market-making for multiple
securities, a relatively high degree of fragmentation
makes it more difﬁcult for dealers to supply liquidity.
One rough measure of fragmentation in the stock of
debt is given by the average issue size (stock out-
standing divided by number of issues) of each market,
presented in Table 5. While the U.S. Treasury market
has the largest stock of outstanding debt, markets in
Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland have proportion-
ally larger numbers of issues outstanding (in relation
to their stock outstanding), indicating a higher degree
of fragmentation.
The fragmentation proﬁle of the stock of outstanding
securities has fallen in recent years as countries low-
ered the frequency of new issues, reduced the number
of maturity classes for each issue, and increased the
average issue size. For example, the United States and
21.   Comparisons of futures markets across countries are not precise, since
the spectrum of maturities covered by futures contracts differs from country
to country.
Table 4
Relationship between Cash and
Futures Markets
(US$ billions)
Yearly trading Yearly trading Futures/Cash

















Note:Figures for trading volume are for the 1997 calendar year. Futures data are for
contracts that have a government security as the underlying asset. For some countries,
annual futures ﬁgures were estimated using average daily trading volumes. Data were
not available for France, Germany, or the Netherlands.
Source: BIS (1999)17 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 1999
Canada stopped issuing 3-year bonds to concentrate
issuance in other areas, and most countries have
moved towards the creation of larger benchmark
issues by periodically reopening these issues. Driving
these changes are the declining debt levels in many
countries and, probably, the realization by debt-man-
agementauthoritiesthatlargerissuescontributetothe
market’s liquidity. The move towards a more concen-
trated proﬁle of debt stock is reﬂected in the generally
larger size of current benchmark issues compared
with the average issue size in each market (Table 5).
Over time, as the more fragmented debt stock
matures, the average issue size should increase.
In general, market liquidity is negatively inﬂuenced
by the imposition of exogenous trading costs such as
transaction taxes. Transaction taxes reduce the incen-
tives to trade, lowering the level of turnover, and in
the end, reducing liquidity. With Japan abolishing its
transaction tax levy on government securities trading
in March 1999, there are now only two countries in the
sample with this type of tax regime still in place—Bel-
gium and Switzerland.22 However, more than half of
the countries in the sample continue to levy withhold-
ing taxes,23 which indirectly increase transaction
22.  Note, however, that the transaction tax applied in these countries is, in
fact, applied rather narrowly and does not affect a large proportion of market
participants.
23. Italy, Belgium, France, and Sweden impose witholding taxes only on indi-
vidual investors, not on institutions. Japan dropped its withholding tax on
non-residents in September 1999.
Table 5


























Note: Benchmark sizes are those for a typical (recent set of) 10-year benchmark issues.
*The following issues were used in these countries: U.K. 7.25% due 12/2007; Bel.
6.25% due 3/2007; Neth. 5.27% due 2/2007; Swe. 6.5% due 5/2008; Switz. 4.25%
due 1/2008.
Source: BIS (1999)
costs. Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
and the United States form the minority of countries
that do not impose withholding taxes.
The fragmentation proﬁle of the stock
of outstanding securities has fallen in
recent years as countries lowered the
frequency of new issues, reduced the
number of maturity classes for each
issue, and increased the average issue
size.
Conclusion
Broadly speaking, liquidity in the market for Govern-
ment of Canada securities has improved over the
1990s. During this period, an important factor has
been the change in the Canadian government’s issu-
ance practices. This has included a commitment to cre-
ating large benchmark issues that has helped bond
market liquidity. It has also included a marked reduc-
tion in the issuance of treasury bills and, given that
liquidity appears to be strongly correlated with a
security’s effective supply, it is not surprising that
trading activity in the treasury bill market has suf-
fered. Over the 1990s, liquidity in the government
securities market has also been supported by changes
in the structure of the market such as the increasing
use of IDBS by dealers and a slight rise in dealer com-
petition. The rise in the level of transparency offered
by the CanPX display system also offers the potential
of increased liquidity in the future. Liquidity in the
government securities market has also, occasionally,
been adversely affected by transitory periods of
above-normal interest rate volatility.
In terms of the readily available liquidity indicators,
the Canadian market seems to compare favourably
with a sample of 11 industrialized countries. Never-
theless, in terms of structural factors, which set the
scene rather than bearing directly on liquidity, the
degree of fragmentation in the debt stock and the
relatively underdeveloped domestic futures markets
could hamper the further enhancement of market
liquidity in Canada.18 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 1999
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